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COMMENTS
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN WISCONSIN: USING
RELIABILITY TO REGULATE EXPERT
TESTIMONY
Trial courts today, both civil and criminal, are faced with ever increas-
ing questions on how to deal with the admission of novel scientific evidence.
Unquestionably, recent years have brought with them an increase in the use
of, and consequently the need for, expert testimony on a variety of sub-
jects.' It seems one can now find an "expert" who is willing to testify to
virtually anything.2
In the face of this, courts are looking at the best way in which to handle
the admission of novel scientific testimony. To date, two major approaches
have been used.' First, there is the "general acceptance" rule, first articu-
lated in Frye v. United States.4 This has become the rule in many federal
1. See, ag., Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. Rnv. 473 (1986).
2. As Judge Weinstein said:
An expert can be found to testify to the truth of almost any factual theory, no matter how
frivolous, thus validating the case sufficiently to avoid summary judgment and force the
matter to trial. At the trial itself an expert's testimony can be used to obfuscate what
would otherwise be a simple case. The most tenuous factual bases are sufficient to produce
firm opinions to a high degree of "medical (or other expert) probability" or even of "cer-
tainty." Juries and judges can be, and sometimes are, misled by the expert-for-hire.
Weinstein, supra note 1, at 482.
The problem outlined by Judge Weinstein is by no means limited to the federal courts.
Speaking of the same problem in Wisconsin courts, J. Ric Gass stated: "the historical strict
scrutiny of expert testimony has fallen by the wayside, allowing virtually any snake oil
salesman to peddle his wares to juries." Gass, Using the Frye Rule to Control Expert Testi-
mony Abuse, FOR THE DEFENSE, February 1989, at 23.
3. While only the two most often used tests will be discussed in this comment, they are by no
means the only tests in use today. Various courts and commentators have suggested alternative
methods as well. See Berger, A Relevancy Approach to Novel Scientific Evidence, 26 JURIMETRICS
J. 245 (1986) (advocating the incorporation of a balancing test into the present Federal Rules of
Evidence); McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 IOWA
L. REv. 879 (1982) (advocating an eleven-factor balancing test which emphasizes both the accu-
racy and reliability of scientific evidence); Starrs, Frye v. United States Restructured and Revital-
ized: A Proposal to Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, 26 JURIMETIuCS J. 249 (1986) (advocating
the incorporation of a Frye-like standard into the Federal Rules of Evidence); Case Comment,
Changing the Standard for Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: State v. Williams, 40 OHiO
ST. L.J. 757 (1979) (advocating a flexible reliability test).
4. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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courts and the majority of other jurisdictions to govern the admission of
scientific testimony.5
Alternatively, courts in a number of jurisdictions have abandoned the
Frye rule in favor of a general relevancy rule.' Wisconsin is, of course, such
a jurisdiction. Under Wisconsin's general relevancy rule,7 novel scientific
evidence is treated no differently than any other kind of evidence with re-
spect to its admission. To be admissible, the evidence need only be relevant,
and helpful to the jury's determination of a fact in issue.'
Both of these tests have their strengths and weaknesses. Both of these
tests have found supporters. However, neither of them has reached a suita-
ble solution which balances the need for scientific evidence with the dangers
inherent therein.9 More importantly, neither of them properly addresses
the underlying concern with scientific evidence - whether it is reliable. 10
The intent of this comment is not to advocate one of these tests over the
other. A number of commentators have already made the arguments on
5. As of today, the following circuits remain followers of the traditional Frye approach: the
Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, as well as the District of Columbia
Circuit. See United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 352-54 (7th Cir. 1989); Novak v. United States,
865 F.2d 718 (6th Cir. 1989); Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1207-08 (6th
Cir. 1988); Kropinski v. World Plan Exec. Council, 853 F.2d 948, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1988); United
States v. Christophe, 833 F.2d 1296, 1299 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54,
59-61 (D.C. Cir. 1987); United States v. McBride, 786 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v.
Metzger, 778 F.2d 1195, 1205 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 3279 (1986); United States v.
Tranowski, 659 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Hendershot, 614 F.2d 648 (9th Cir.
1980).
However, the Second, Third, Sixth and Eighth Circuits also have precedent indicating a move
away from the Frye approach. See infra note 6.
6. Recently, there has been movement away from the Frye standard in the Second, Third,
Fourth, Sixth and Eighth Circuits. See United States v. Ferri, 778 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 1985); United
States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Luschen, 614 F.2d 1164, 1169
(8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v.
Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 438 (6th Cir. 1970).
Also, there has been a move toward the general relevancy standard in the following states:
California, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Montana, New Mex-
ico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Utah, and Wyoming. Imwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting
Scientific Evidence: A Critique from the Perspective of Juror Psychology, 28 VILL. L. RaV. 554
(1983). This is, of course, in addition to Wisconsin. State v. Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d 483, 351
N.W.2d 469 (1984).
7. Wisconsin's general relevancy rule was best described in State v. Walstad. Walstad, 119
Wis. 2d at 519, 351 N.W.2d at 487. See infra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
8. This two-pronged test comes directly from Wis. STAT. § 907.02 (1975).
9. See infra notes 86-111 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 150-64 and accompanying text.
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both sides.II Rather, the purpose of this comment is to draw from the
strengths of both, with an eye toward fashioning an alternative test which
properly considers the reliability of scientific evidence and the trial judge's
role in its admissibility.
To that end, this comment will begin with a brief discussion of the Frye
rule, and its current status in American jurisprudence.12 Then, part two
will discuss the development of the general relevance rule in Wisconsin,
with special emphasis on the role of the trial judge in the admission of scien-
tific evidence. 3 Finally, part three will discuss the present rules with an eye
toward providing trial judges with an alternative rule to employ when faced
with novel scientific evidence. 14
I. THE "GENERAL ACCEPTANCE" TEST OF FRYE . UNITED STATES
The rule that predominates the majority of jurisdictions with respect to
expert testimony is the "general acceptance" rule, first articulated in Frye v.
United States. 5 Frye was a defendant tried for murder, who sought to in-
troduce the results of a lie detector test.16 The test, which was a precursor
to the polygraph test of today, measured systolic blood pressure and was at
the time quite experimental. 7
The court, in its rather brief decision,18 articulated the fundamental
concern with admitting novel scientific evidence when it stated the
following:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle
must be recognized, and while the courts will go a long way in ad-
mitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific
principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made
must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in
the particular field to which it belongs.19
11. For a recent discussion of the commentators' positions, see Black, A Unified Theory of
Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595 (1988); Comment, The Frye Doctrine and Rele-
vancy Approach Controversy: An Empirical Evaluation, 74 GEO. L.J. 1769 (1986).
12. See infra notes 15-41 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 42-132 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 43-78 and accompanying text.
15. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
16. Frye, 293 F. at 1013.
17. Id.
18. The decision of the D.C. Circuit was only two pages long.
19. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
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Although not expressly stated, inherent in this test is the trial court's
concern about the reliability of novel scientific techniques, such as the lie
detector offered by the defendant.20 The Frye court seemed to adopt the
"general acceptance" test as a method to ensure reliability. If a novel scien-
tific technique is generally accepted, its likelihood of reliability is increased.
Because the systolic blood pressure analysis was not yet generally ac-
cepted by the scientific community, the evidence was excluded by the
court.21 The rule articulated by the Frye court was soon adopted by the
majority of jurisdictions to govern the admission of novel scientific testi-
mony.22 To this day, it remains the test used by a number of federal and
states courts.23
While the Frye rule became the leading rule in the nation with respect to
novel scientific evidence, it also came under attack from a number of
sources.24 These attacks centered around two main criticisms. First, critics
argue that the rule is too conservative in that it requires the proponent of
the evidence to cross too high a threshold of acceptance before the evidence
will be heard by the jury.2" Second, the test, critics argue, is difficult and
arbitrary in its application.26
A. Frye Requires the Proponent of Expert Testimony to Prove Too Much
The brunt of the criticism in this regard, is that the Frye rule confuses
the concepts of admissibility of the evidence, weight of the evidence, and
judicial notice of the evidence.27 The leading writer in this area is Professor
McCormick. He states:
20. Professor Imwinkelried has commented, "The Frye rule rests on the premise that most
lay jurors overestimate the probative value of scientific evidence and, therefore, need the protec-
tion of a screening by the trial judge." Imwinkelried, Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide
Questions of Preliminary Facts Conditioning the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence?, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 577, 580 (1984). See also Comment, supra note 11, at 1773.
21. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
22. In fact, by the late 1970s, one commentator noted that Frye was the governing test in
forty-five states. Comment, supra note 3, at 769.
23. See supra note 5.
24. Virtually from its inception, the Frye rule has come under attack. While most commenta-
tors agree that the reasoning behind the rule was well intentioned, they argue that the standard it
sets and the manner in which it is employed causes more problems than it solves. See Black, supra
note 11, at 629-30. For a more in-depth discussion of these issues, see infra notes 27-42 and
accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
27. See generally C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, § 203 (3d ed. 1984). This comment will focus
very little on the weight to be afforded scientific evidence. For a good discussion of this issue, see
Imwinkelried, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evidence - A Primer on Evaluating the
Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 261 (1981).
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"General scientific acceptance" is a proper condition for taking judi-
cial notice of scientific facts, but it is not a suitable criterion for the
admissibility of scientific evidence. Any relevant conclusions sup-
ported by a qualified expert witness should be received unless there
are distinct reasons for exclusion. These reasons are the familiar
ones of prejudicing or misleading the jury or consuming undue
amounts of time.28
The problems of misplaced faith or blind deference on the part of the
jury to the expert's opinion are remedied by a vigorous cross examination,
resort to learned treatises, and the testimony of rebuttal experts.2 9 In this
way, the jury hears evidence on both sides of the scientific issue, and deter-
mines for itself whether the testimony should be given any weight. After
all, even the most sound scientific principles had to gain acceptance at some
time. Valid scientific principles should not be banned from the courtroom
merely because they have not been in existence for sufficient time to gain
general acceptance.
This type of reasoning gained widespread popularity with the adoption
of the Federal Rules of Evidence."0 More specifically, the rules regarding
the admission of expert testimony found in Rules 702 and 703.31 These
rules do not distinguish between novel scientific testimony and any other
type of testimony given by expert witnesses. For example, Rule 702 gives
wide latitude for the admission of expert testimony. Specifically, it states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experi-
28. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 203, at 491 (2d ed. 1972).
29. Id., n. 30.
30. Arguably, the Frye decision is no longer applicable after the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. See J. WEINSTEIN, EVIDENCE 702[03], at 702-36 (1987) (Advisory Com-
mittee Note's failure to mention Frye must be considered significant. The silence of the Rule and
its drafters may be an abandonment of the general acceptance standard.).
Even if Frye is still effective after the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the scathing
criticism it has received has prompted one commentator to write:
Perhaps Frye will survive this period of criticism and rejection. It is certainly a convenient
label for courts that want to reject scientific evidence without engaging in a careful analysis
of its reliability and relevance. Yet its survival seems unlikely. Too many courts in too
many different jurisdictions have abandoned Frye in too short a time. The restrictive gen-
eral acceptance test is simply inconsistent with modem evidence concepts favoring admis-
sibility of expert testimony.
Rossi, Modern Evidence and the Expert Witness, 12 LITIGATION 18, 20-21 (1985).
31. FED. R. EVID. 702 and 703. See also United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir.
1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979) (court held that Rules 702 and 703 overrule Frye, and
the only balancing factors come from Rule 403).
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ence, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise.3 2
Likewise, Rule 703 allows an expert witness to base his or her conclu-
sions on any facts or data, even if they are otherwise inadmissible, provided
that they are "reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field."33
The Federal Rules of Evidence, then, do not contain a general acceptance
standard. Because of this, opponents to the Frye standard contend that the
general acceptance standard forces the proponent of the scientific evidence
to pass too great a hurdle before such evidence is admitted.
B. The Application of the General Acceptance Test
Is Difficult and Arbitrary
Those who oppose the Frye rule on this ground state that there are sev-
eral difficulties in the application of the rule. Analyzing a case under the
Frye rule is a two step process. First, the court must identify the field of
science in which the underlying principle falls.3 4 Second, the court must
determine whether the principle has gained general acceptance by the mem-
bers of that field.35 Both of these steps present difficulties.
First, many of the novel scientific techniques are extremely difficult to
categorize as being from any one field of science. For example, polygraph
evidence, 6 "voiceprint" evidence,37 and bite mark identification testi-
32. FED. R. EVID. 702.
33. FED. R. EVID. 703.
34. This issue deals with who must accept the procedure, and is not easily resolved. One
commentator has stated:
Deciding what is the proper field to which a novel test belongs is in itself a chore. Most
novel tests represent new approaches to the solution of old problems by a process which is
unknown, or belongs to a different field. Because of this, the person developing a novel test
frequently finds himself on the fringes of his scientific discipline, and perhaps overlapping
into other disciplines.
Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half Century
Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1208 n. 68 (1990) (quoting Moenssens, Polygraph Test Results
Meet Standards for Admissibility as Evidence, in Legal Admissibility of the Polygraph 14, 17 (N.
Ansley Ed. 1975)).
35. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 476 ("Whatever the 'general acceptance' test meant, it
became clear that the Frye rule might block the introduction of important and useful testimony.");
see also Giannelli, supra note 34, at 1215-16; Goodman & Zak, The Heat is On: Thermograms as
Evidence Under the Frye Standard, 8 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 13 (1986).
36. Most courts put polygraph evidence in the field of psychology, but it arguably falls under
other fields as well. See Giannelli, supra note 34; Note, The Emergence of the Polygraph at Trial,
73 COLUM. L. RPv. 1120, 1123 (1973).
37. Voiceprint analysis may fall within a number of scientific fields, including anatomy, phys-
iology, physics, psychology, and linguistics. People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr.
478 (1968).
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mony3s may fall within one of several disciplines. In many instances,
choosing the field in which the scientific evidence falls is determinative of
the outcome as to its admissibility.3 9 The choice is left to the broad discre-
tion of the trial judge," and there is great potential for any such decision to
be arbitrary.
Next, once the field is chosen, determining whether there is general ac-
ceptance within the field is no simple task. The question remains, what is
"general acceptance?" The Frye decision is of very little help in making this
determination. Nowhere does the court state the ratio or percentage of
members of the group required to accept the principle before it can be
deemed to be "generally accepted."4 Because its application is so difficult,
and because the results can be arbitrary, the Frye rule has been criticized
and abandoned in some jurisdictions.
II. THE GENERAL RELEVANCE TEST CURRENTLY
USED IN WISCONSIN
Wisconsin courts have not treated scientific and expert evidence with
any appreciable degree of certainty or consistency, and have admitted as
much.42 Early cases quoted the language of Frye; however, none of them
expressly adopted it.43 Later cases expressly rejected the "general accept-
ance" test of Frye,' but the language of the opinion still haunts Wisconsin
38. Bite mark identification may involve the fields of medicine, People v. Milone, 43 Inl. App.
3d 385, 356 N.E.2d 1350 (1976); dentistry, People v. Slone, 76 Cal. App. 3d 611, 143 Cal. Rptr. 61
(1978); or forensic odontology, State v. Stinson, 134 Wis. 2d 224, 397 N.W.2d 136 (1986).
39. The court can, to some extent, control the admission of scientific testimony by choosing
either a broad or restrictive field. See, eg., Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198 ("selection of the 'relevant
scientific community' appears to influence the result").
40. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
41. Id.
42. The Wisconsin Supreme Court acknowledged the confusing treatment Wisconsin has
given the Frye rule, stating:
The trial judge erred when he stated that he was "constrained by the principles elucidated
in Frye.. .," and he was incorrect when he stated the Frye test was the accepted standard
for the admissibility of scientific testimony. We hasten to add, however, that this court's
treatment of Frye has not been marked by certainty or consistency.
State v. Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d 483, 515, 351 N.W.2d 469, 485 (1984).
43. See, eg., State v. Stanislawski, 62 Wis. 2d 730, 216 N.W.2d 8 (1974); State v. Bohner, 210
Wis. 651, 246 N.W. 314 (1933).
44. See, e.g., State v. Hamm, 146 Wis. 2d 130, 430 N.W.2d 584 (Ct. App. 1988); State v.
Shaw, 124 Wis. 2d 363, 369 N.W.2d 772 (1985); Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d 483, 351 N.W.2d 469;
Watson v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 264, 219 N.W.2d 398 (1974).
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courts.4 5 To better understand where Wisconsin should be going with re-
spect to scientific and expert evidence, one needs to analyze both where the
law has been, and how it got where it is today.
A. Development of Wisconsin Case Law
The first reference to the standards of admissibility for scientific evi-
dence in the post-Frye era came in State v. Bohner,4" some ten years after
the decision in Frye. Bohner was a case involving the admissibility of re-
sults from a systolic blood pressure deception test - the same type of test
analyzed in Frye.47 In its decision to exclude such evidence, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that "the systolic blood pressure deception test has not
yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and
psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert tes-
timony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far
made."48
The test, as is obvious from the language used, is a restatement of the
general acceptance test set forth in the Frye decision. In fact, the Bohner
court quoted from Frye in making this determination. 49 This seemingly ob-
vious attempt to adopt the Frye rule, however, was not to be the last word
in Wisconsin.
Some forty years later, the court was again faced with the issue of the
admissibility of polygraphic evidence. 0 In its consideration of the issue,
the court took into account the fact that the general acceptance test had
been the subject of recent criticism, especially since the adoption of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence. 1 However, in determining that evidence of poly-
graph test results may be admissible under certain conditions, 2 the court
proceeded to list the advances in technology, since Bohner, which made
45. Wisconsin courts seem intent upon applying some kind of Frye-like limitations on the
admission of expert testimony. For a discussion of this type of limitation, see infra notes 112-132
and accompanying text.
46. 210 Wis. 651, 246 N.W. 314 (1933).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 658, 246 N.W. at 317.
49. Id. at 657, 246 N.W. at 317.
50. State v. Stanislawski, 62 Wis. 2d 730, 216 N.W.2d 8 (1974).
51. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
52. The Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that the admission of polygraphic evidence by
either the defendant or a complaining witness requires: (1) a written stipulation between the prose-
cutor, the defendant, and defense counsel; (2) the consent of the court; (3) that the expert offering
the testimony be subject to cross-examination; and (4) the jury be instructed that the evidence is
offered only as proof of whether the individual was telling the truth at the time of the examination.
Stanislawski, 62 Wis. 2d at 742-43, 216 N.W.2d at 13-14 (citing State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371
P.2d 894 (1962)).
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polygraphs more accurate and generally accepted by the scientific commu-
nity.5 3 Specifically, the court stated:
This increased use and acceptance reflects the establishing of poly-
graph tests, conducted by a competent examiner, as having gained
"standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psy-
chological authorities" in their particular field. Experts in the field
give a high degree of accuracy or dependability to polygraph exami-
nations, conducted by a competent examiner. Polygraph test accu-
racy is viewed as comparing favorably with other types of expert
testimony such as that given by psychiatrists, document examiners
and physicians.5 4
While the court did find reason to criticize the application of the Frye
test of admissibility in Wisconsin, 5 it did, nonetheless, take great pains to
demonstrate that the polygraph had moved from the "twilight zone" of
Frye, and had gained general acceptance. 6 The court's ruling with respect
to both the admissibility of polygraph evidence and the Frye rule, however,
was to be short lived.
The following year, in Watson v. State,57 the court had the opportunity
to consider whether evidence, relating to the identification of hair samples
as being those of the defendant,58 was properly admitted.5 9 Taking the Frye
issue head-on, the court weighed the general acceptance test against the
general relevance test, as set forth by Professor McCormick.' ° Quoting
from McCormick, the court stated:
"General scientific acceptance" is a proper condition for taking judi-
cial notice of scientific facts, but not a criterion for the admissibility
of scientific evidence. Any relevant conclusions which are supported
53. Stanislawski, 62 Wis. 2d at 736-40, 216 N.W.2d at 11-13.
54. Id. at 738-39, 216 N.W.2d at 12.
55. Id. at 736-37, 216 N.W.2d at 11.
56. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
57. 64 Wis. 2d 264, 219 N.W.2d 398 (1974).
58. In Watson, the defendant was tried for burglary. At the time of the burglary, the victim
was unable to see her assailant, but stated that his voice sounded like that of a black male and that
he wore a goatee. Police officers were able to find, at the scene, a chin hair which was subse-
quently identified as being that of the defendant. Id. at 272, 219 N.W.2d at 402.
59. The state offered testimony to the effect that it was possible to determine from the sample
that the hair was from a black male with blood type B. Further, the state's expert stated that the
victim could identify the hair as being from the body of the defendant. Id.
The issue in the case was whether the technique used by the state's expert had gained general
acceptance, so as to be admissible under the Frye rule. The state took the position that general
acceptance was not required, and that the question was governed by State v. Hunt, 53 Wis. 2d
734, 193 N.W.2d 858 (1972), which involved testimony on the same issue from the very same
expert. Watson, 64 Wis. 2d at 272-73, 219 N.W.2d at 403.
60. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 203, at 489 (2d ed. 1972).
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by a qualified expert witness should be received unless there are
other reasons for exclusion. Particularly, probative value may be
overborne by familiar dangers of prejudicing or misleading the jury,
and undue consumption of time. If the courts use this approach,
instead of repeating a supposed requirement of "general acceptance"
not elsewhere imposed, they would arrive at a practical way of
utilizing the results of scientific advances.61
Based upon the strength of the general relevance approach, the court
held that "the identification of the chin hair was a matter of expert testi-
mony that could be challenged by cross-examination or impeaching evi-
dence, either from other experts or from treatises."' 62 In so holding, the
Watson court set the stage for the "battle of experts" which is commonplace
in Wisconsin courtrooms today.
Even in light of this seemingly unequivocal language, however, trial
courts were reluctant to give up the general acceptance test. As late as
1984, trial courts were not only using a general acceptance test, they were
referring to Frye by name. For example, in State v. Walstad,63 the court
stated that "a problem is presented by the fact that the trial judge stated
'[t]he Frye test remains the accepted standard for admissibility of scientific
testimony.' "64
The Walstad court corrected the trial judge's misunderstanding6 and,
in so doing, provided the first in depth discussion of both the development
of the law of scientific evidence in Wisconsin, and the application of the
Wisconsin Rules of Evidence. 6 With respect to the Rules of Evidence, the
court stated the following:
The rules in regard to the admission of expert testimony are also
clear. The Wisconsin Rules of Evidence... provide that, if scientific
or specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to determine a
fact in issue, a qualified expert may testify. As the commentary to
Rule 907.02 points out, under Rule 907.02 expert testimony is ad-
missible if relevant and will be excluded only if the testimony is su-
perfluous or a waste of time. The Frye concept is alien to the
Wisconsin law of evidence.67
61. Watson, 64 Wis. 2d at 273, 219 N.W.2d at 403.
62. Id. at 274, 219 N.W.2d at 403.
63. 119 Wis. 2d 483, 351 N.W.2d 469 (1984).
64. Id. at 515, 351 N.W.2d at 485.
65. While it did expressly state that the trial judge erroneously held that the Frye standard
was applicable in Wisconsin, the court accepted much of the blame for the misunderstanding. Id.
66. Wisconsin adopted the original version of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1974. This
explains some of the differences between the existing Wisconsin and Federal Rules. Imwinkelried,
supra note 20, at 580.
67. Walstad, 119 Wis.2d at 516, 351 N.W.2d at 486.
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What the opinion does not discuss, however, is that the Wisconsin Rules
of Evidence with respect to both expert testimony and relevance are identi-
cal to the Federal Rules of Evidence.68 Even with the language of the Fed-
eral Rules, federal courts continue to apply the Frye rule.6 9 What the
Walstad court deduced from its review of the Wisconsin case law is the
following rule with respect to the admissibility of scientific evidence.
The "general acceptance" standard has been the subject of con-
siderable scholarly criticism in recent years. In particular, it has
been suggested that the requirement of "general acceptance" is tan-
tamount to a requirement that the validity of the test be susceptible
of such demonstration as to enable the trial court to take judicial
notice of the fact. Clearly, the criteria used for determining the ad-
missibility of scientific evidence should not require the instant and
unquestionable demonstration required for the judicial notice of sci-
entific facts. Other types of scientific evidence have been admitted
into evidence under less stringent standards which merely require
the evidence to be "an aid to the jury" or "reliable enough to be
probative."
This is the relevancy test of our rules and we adhere to it. 0
B. General Relevancy and the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence
The effect of the general relevancy test for the admissibility of scientific
evidence has been to focus attention on three issues. First, it becomes criti-
cal under this test to "qualify" the witness as an expert.71 Second, once this
is accomplished, the judge must determine whether the testimony is rele-
vant.72 Finally, the judge must determine that the testimony will be helpful
to the trier of fact.73 All three of these things are rather easily
accomplished.
Under the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence, a witness can be qualified as an
expert by virtue of his or her "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
68. Wis. STAT. § 907.02 (1975) reads: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise." This language is identical to the Federal Rules of Evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
69. Although the language is identical, the Wisconsin and federal rules have been interpreted
differently. Many federal jurisdictions continue to apply the general acceptance standard. See
supra note 5.
70. Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d at 519, 351 N.W.2d at 487 (quoting State v. Cantanese, 368 So. 2d
975, 979 (La. 1979)).
71. Wis. STAT. § 907.02 (1975).
72. WIs. STAT. § 904.01 (1975).
73. WIs. STAT. § 907.02 (1975).
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education."'74 There is nothing in the rules that requires the proponent of
scientific evidence to do anything more to "qualify" the witness as an ex-
pert. In effect, any person with knowledge beyond the ken of the average
juryman can be qualified as an expert under the rules.75
Similarly, the rules regarding relevance provide little difficulty to over-
come. The Rules define "relevant evidence" as evidence "having any ten-
dency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence."' 76 The threshold for relevancy is rarely the barrier to
admission of scientific evidence that it could be.7 7
Finally, the test under the Rules is one of helpfulness to the jury.78 That
is, even if the subject matter is such that it is understandable to the jury, if
expert testimony will further help them in some way, it is admissible.79
Taken together, these three tests obviously favor the admission of scientific
evidence, regardless of the underlying theory.
74. Id.
75. The Wisconsin Rules of Evidence also incorporate opinion testimony from lay witnesses.
Wis. STAT. § 907.01 (1975). The Rule reads:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions
and inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on
the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testi-
mony or the determination of a fact in issue.
Wis. STAT. § 907.01 (1975).
While lay witnesses may not testify with respect to scientific principles, an interesting observa-
tion was made by Judge Weinstein. He stated that there is "[a]n almost unbroken continuum of
admissible opinions of lay persons, conventional experts, and new types of experts is the result."
Weinstein, supra note 1, at 479. This creates a potential problem with respect to the classification
of experts. Under the traditional general relevancy approach, there may be very little separating a
lay witness, who may not testify to scientific evidence, and a conventional expert who can.
76. Wis. STAT. § 904.01 (1975).
77. See infra notes 86-95 and 150-64 and accompanying text.
78. Some types of cases have been held to require expert testimony. See, e.g., Kujawski v.
Arbor View Health Care Center, 139 Wis. 2d 455, 407 N.W.2d 249 (1987) (setting forth criteria
for when medical expert is required); Albert v. Waelti, 133 Wis. 2d 142, 394 N.W.2d 752 (Ct.
App. 1986) (expert testimony is required to prove dental malpractice); Helbrecht v. St. Paul Ins.
Co., 122 Wis. 2d 94, 362 N.W.2d 118 (1985) (expert testimony required in legal malpractice case).
However, even when expert testimony (including scientific testimony) is not required, it may
be permitted when it is helpful to the jury. State v. Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d 1, 398 N.W.2d 763
(1987); Valiga v. National Food Co., 58 Wis. 2d 232, 206 N.W.2d 377 (1973).
79. As the court held in Friedrich:
Whether opinion testimony of expert witnesses is properly received depends upon whether
the members of the jury, having the knowledge and general experience common to every
member of the community, would be aided in consideration of the issues by the testimony
offered. The expert testimony must assist the trier of fact.
Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d at 15, 398 N.W.2d at 769 (citing Valiga, 58 Wis. 2d at 251, 206 N.W.2d at
388, and Wis. STAT. § 907.02 (1975)).
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The safeguard to this system, as seen by the Walstad court,"° is that the
opponent of the testimony will have the opportunity to thoroughly cross-
examine the expert offering the scientific testimony. This is evident in the
following passage from the court in Walstad.
[E]vidence, if given by a qualified expert, [is] admissible irrespective
of the underlying theory on which the testimony [is] based. The
fundamental determination of admissibility comes at the time the
witness is "qualified" as an expert. In a state such as 'Wisconsin,
where substantially unlimited cross-examination is permitted, the
underlying theory or principle on which the admissibility is based
can be attacked by cross-examination or by other types of impeach-
ment. Whether a scientific witness whose testimony is relevant is
believed is a question of credibility for the finder of fact, but it
clearly is admissible.81
C. Problems Inherent in the General Relevance Approach
While grounded on the theory that the more evidence the jury has, the
better its decision will be, the general relevance test for the admission of
scientific evidence contains inherent problems.8 2 These problems exist in
both the definition of relevance in connection with scientific testimony," as
well as the effect of scientific testimony on the jury. 4 These problems arise
because proper attention is not given to the question of whether the scien-
tific testimony is reliable, and therefore relevant.8 '
1. The Relevance Dilemma
The determination of whether scientific evidence is relevant must turn,
to some extent, on whether it is at all reliable.8 6 Scientific evidence which is
not reliable will not have "any tendency" to make a fact in issue more or
less probable.87 It has been said that the reliability of evidence derived from
a scientific principle depends upon three factors: (1) the validity of the un-
derlying principle; (2) the validity of the technique applying that principle;
and (3) the proper application of the technique on a particular occasion. 8
80. State v. Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d 483, 351 N.W.2d 469 (1984).
81. Id. at 518-19, 351 N.W.2d at 487.
82. See infra notes 86-111 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 96-111 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 150-64 and accompanying text.
86. See Giannelli, supra note 34; Imwinkelried, supra note 20.
87. Wis. STAT. § 904.01 (1975).
88. Giannelli, supra note 34, at 1200-01. This article was quoted with approval in State v.
Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d 483, 351 N.W.2d 469 (1984), when the court stated "The excellent article,
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Under this theory, before the results of a scientific test can be relevant,
all three of the factors above must be satisfied. That is, the underlying prin-
ciple must be valid, the technique used must validly test the principle, and
the technique must have been properly performed with respect to the spe-
cific evidence sought to be admitted at trial.8 9 By the same token, if one of
these factors is lacking, the scientific evidence will not be reliable, and the
evidence will, to the extent that it is not reliable, lose relevance.'
Under the general relevance test as it has been articulated in Wisconsin,
the existence of these three factors is considered a factual question to be
determined by the jury.91 This rationale carries with it presuppositions that
may run contrary to the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence with respect to
relevance.92
Specifically, the rules indicate that all relevant evidence is admissible;
however, evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.9 Therefore, by
leaving the reliability questions for the jury to answer, we may be allowing
them to hear irrelevant, therefore inadmissible, evidence. Should the jury
determine that the principle upon which the scientific evidence is based is
invalid, the evidence derived from it will no longer have "any tendency" to
make a fact in issue more or less likely, as is required by the Rules.94 Simi-
larly, should the jury determine that the technique used to measure the
principle was either invalid or improperly performed, the same result is
reached. The evidence is unreliable and irrelevant. In effect, we are asking
[by] Giannelli, ... criticizes the Frye rule as nonworkable, but also argues that the alternative
relevancy rule of the type accepted in Wisconsin may also present evidentiary pitfalls, and create
undue reliance on expert witnesses." Id. at 519 n.13, 351 N.W.2d at 487 n.13.
89. The first two factors are usually in dispute with respect to novel scientific evidence. Once
a principle or technique is sufficiently established, these factors may be satisfied through judicial
notice of the principle and/or technique. Giannelli, supra note 34, at 1202.
Rule 201 deals with judicial notice of adjudicative facts and provides: "A judicially noticed
fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within
the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." FED. R. EViD. 201(b). In
the context of scientific evidence, judicial notice would be found under sub. (1) above.
90. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. See also State v. Shaw, 124 Wis. 2d 363,
367, 369 N.W.2d 772, 774 (Ct. App. 1985).
91. See, eg., Shaw, 124 Wis. 2d at 367, 369 N.W.2d at 773 ("The underlying scientific theory
is subject to cross-examination and impeachment, and its credibility is for the finder of fact.");
Watson, 64 Wis. 2d at 274, 219 N.W.2d at 403 ("The question is one of credibility to be resolved
by the jury.").
92. More specifically, they may run contrary to the relevance rules found in Wis. STAT.
§ 904.01, which defines relevant evidence as having "any tendency" to make a fact in issue more
or less probable, and WIs. STAT. § 904.02, which states that only relevant evidence is properly
admitted.
93. Wis. STAT. § 904.02 (1975).
94. Id.
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the jury to determine whether the evidence is relevant, and therefore prop-
erly before them, after they have already heard it.95
2. The Jury's Response to Scientific Evidence
The fact that the jury will determine, for itself, which evidence is or is
not relevant becomes of more concern when one considers the way in which
juries view scientific evidence. Several studies have been undertaken to de-
termine the effect that scientific testimony has on the jury's decision in any
given case.
96
One of the earliest studies dealt with the then novel polygraph and its
effect on the jury's analysis.9 7 In this study, jurors were interviewed after
deliberating a case in which polygraphic evidence had been admitted by the
court.9" The results of the survey indicated that half of the jurors found the
scientific testimony so overwhelming that they accepted it without ques-
tion.99 Four of the members of the jury even went so far as to consider the
95. The effect of this reasoning is to place an unwitting fox in charge of the evidentiary
chicken coop. Professor Imwinkelried illustrated the problem with the example of evidence which
may be covered by the attorney-client privilege. If a dispute arises as to whether a third party was
present, thus waiving the privilege, there is a risk in allowing the jury to decide this issue, espe-
cially if they decide no third party was present.
A material risk exists that the jury will not disregard the communication even if it con-
cludes that the communication was privileged. If testimony about the communication is
presented to the jury, the jurors will have difficulty expunging the testimony from their
minds. Although the testimony is technically inadmissible, the jurors have heard the testi-
mony, and may be subconsciously affected. The judge's instruction to disregard the evi-
dence will be ineffective; even a rational juror acting in good faith may not be able to honor
the instruction.
Imwinkelried, supra note 20, at 597.
The same problem exists with respect to scientific evidence. If the jury decides that the evi-
dence is unreliable, it is technically inadmissible. However, at that point the bell will have been
rung, and an instruction to disregard may be of little or no value.
96. See generally Cavoukian & Heslegrave, The Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in Court:
Some Empirical Findings, 4 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 117 (1980); Carlson, Pasano & Jannuzzo, The
Effect of Lie Detector Evidence on Jury Deliberations: An Empirical Study, 5 J. POLICE Sd. &
ADMIN. 148 (1977); Forkosch, The Lie Detector and the Courts, 16 N.Y.U.L.Q. 202 (1938);
Hosch, Beck & McIntyre, Influence of Expert Testimony Regarding Eyewitness Accuracy on Jury
Decisions, 4 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 287 (1980); Koffler, The Lie Detector - A Critical Appraisal of
the Technique as a Potential Undermining Factor in the Judicial Process, 3 N.Y.L.F. 123 (1957);
Loftus, Psychological Aspects of Courtroom Testimony, 347 ANNUALS N.Y. ACAD. SCl. 27 (1980);
Markwart & Lynch, The Effect of Polygraph Evidence on Mock Jury Decision-Making, 7 J. PO-
LICE SCI. & ADMIN. 324 (1979); Rosenthal, Nature of Jury Response to the Expert Witness, 28 J.
FORENSIC Sci. 528 (1983); Saks & Wissler, Legal and Psychological Bases of Expert Testimony
Surveys and the Law of Jurors, 2 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 435 (1985).
97. Forkosch, supra note 96.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 229-30.
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polygraph evidence conclusive proof of the guilt or innocence of the
defendant. 100
This study seemed to indicate that jurors could be swayed by scientific
testimony, alone, without respect to the other evidence in the case. Advo-
cates of the general relevance test point to the fact that such dangers can be
overcome by vigorously cross-examining the expert offering the testimony,
or by providing expert testimony in rebuttal.1° 1 While this response does
have merit, it has two major drawbacks. First, when conflicting expert tes-
timony is offered on an issue, the focus of the trial is lost on proving or
disproving the validity of the scientific principle. Second, a jury that is
faced with an esoteric or highly technical issue will often decide the issue
based on the expert who makes the best impression upon them. In effect,
the trial is reduced to a popularity contest between the experts and the cru-
cial determination on the underlying issues is never properly addressed.
Both of these dangers are illustrated in a study done by Rosenthal. 2
In his study, Rosenthal studied a trial in which experimental
"voiceprint"' 03 evidence was admitted against a criminal defendant."°  Ro-
senthal indicates that although "the trial was originally expected to last two
or three weeks; it went almost seven and the bulk of the time was spent
hearing expert testimony on the validity of voiceprint identification."' 0 5 In
this trial, the argument over the scientific evidence lasted over twice as long
as the rest of the case.
Rosenthal also reported findings consistent with the fear that jurors
would not rely on the weight of the scientific evidence to make their deci-
sions; rather, they would side with the expert they liked best for completely
subjective reasons. 10 6 A survey of the jurors after the deliberation in this
case revealed that the expert whose testimony was overwhelmingly ac-
100. Id. at 230.
101. For Wisconsin's treatment of this issue, see Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d at 518-19, 351 N.W.2d
at 487.
102. Rosenthal, supra note 96.
103. "Voiceprint" analysis, or sound spectrograph, is a process which purports to identify an
individual by the sound of his or her voice. A measuring device produces a series of shadings on
electrosensitive paper, in response to the sound of one's voice. The images represent sound fea-
tures of a voice. The underlying theory is that each person's voice will produce unique images.
See Note, The Voiceprint Dilemma: Should Voices Be Seen and Not Heard?, 35 MD. L. REV. 267
(1975); Annotation, Admissibility and Weight of Voiceprint Evidence, 97 A.L.R.3d 294 (1980).
104. Rosenthal, supra note 96, at 529.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 530-31.
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cepted by the jury was a professor from Stanford University. 10 7 When
asked why his testimony carried so much weight with them, the universal
perception of the jurors was that he was "a real scientist." ' Typical com-
ments included "Some of the others looked like hippies .... This guy was a
real scientist, I could tell."'1o9
The results of this study confirm the weakness inherent in allowing un-
fettered admission of expert testimony. Not only was the trial time length-
ened by four to five weeks by the debate over the scientific testimony, the
survey of the jury also indicates that the entire time was wasted. 110 Despite
hearing four to five weeks of debate over the validity of this scientific tech-
nique, the jury ultimately based its determination, not on the merits of
voiceprint identification, but on the testimony of the expert who they sub-
jectively liked best.111
D. The Three-Pronged Test Developed in R.P.R.
An extremely interesting line of case law has arisen in Wisconsin which
indicates that the court is cognizant of the need to find scientific testimony
reliable before allowing it to go to the jury. This line of cases also indicates
how Wisconsin courts seem reluctant to part with some qualification on the
general relevance test. These cases deal with the three-pronged test for the
admission of expert testimony first articulated by the court of appeals in In
the Matter of Adoption of R.P.R..112
The evidence sought to be admitted in this case was related to the the-
ory of "rejection trauma"11 and its effect on adopted children.114 As a
107. While he remained nameless, Rosenthal described the Stanford professor as being "ex-
tremely articulate, his hair was short and trim, he wore glasses and a brown business suit, and
presented himself in a very conservative and positive way." Id. at 529.
108. Id. at 530.
109. Id.
110. This is an issue which will also arise in the context of a motion to exclude expert testi-
mony under FED. R. EVID. 403, as a consideration of undue delay. In Wisconsin, the same rule is
found in Wis. STAT. § 904.03 (1975). The trial judge is given broad discretion in whether to
admit or exclude evidence under this section. State v. Hamm, 146 Wis. 2d 130, 142, 430 N.W.2d
584, 591 (Ct. App. 1988); State v. Wollman, 86 Wis. 2d 459, 464, 273 N.W.2d 225, 228 (1979).
111. Rosenthal indicated that the jury did not, or could not, decide the scientific issue on its
merits; rather, they decided to adopt the position of the person who looked most like a "real
scientist." Rosenthal, supra note 96, at 530. A substantial delay in the trial, especially a criminal
trial, may be warranted if the jury is able to make proper use of the testimony. If, as in the
Rosenthal study, the jury is unable to make proper use of the testimony, the trial judge may
properly exclude the testimony under § 904.03.
112. 95 Wis. 2d 573, 291 N.W.2d 591 (Ct. App. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, sub. noma.
Brandt v. Witzling, 98 Wis. 2d 613, 297 N.W.2d 833 (1980).
113. "Rejection trauma," according to the proponent of the evidence, is a condition in adop-
tive children in which they suffer an identity crisis and question their adoptive parents about the
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basis to reject expert testimony in this area, the court articulated the follow-
ing test.
The elements of admissible expert testimony are: (1) the subject
is distinctly related to some science, profession, business or occupa-
tion and therefore beyond the realm of the average layman; (2) the
expert has sufficient skill in the area to aid the trier of fact in his
search for the truth; and (3) the state of the pertinent art or scientific
knowledge in the subject is sufficiently developed to allow a reason-
able opinion to be asserted by an expert. 115
In addition to the requirements already appearing in the Wisconsin
Rules of Evidence,' 1 6 the court added the third prong of the test, which
requires the subject to be sufficiently developed to allow a reasonable opin-
ion on the issue. Although later construed differently by the court," 7 this
prong of the test seeks to require the scientific knowledge to be sufficiently
developed so as to be reliable."'
Rather than allow the evidence to be put forth in front of the jury, the
court decided that the evidence of rejection trauma was not more than
"baseless conjecture unsupported by any documentary evidence or treatise
on the subject.""' 9 Because of this, the offered testimony failed to meet the
third prong of the test above, and was excluded. While the case was ulti-
mately overruled by the supreme court on other grounds, 20 this test for the
admissibility of expert testimony arguably stood intact.
Four years later, in State v. Stinson,121 the court of appeals was con-
fronted with the issue of whether to admit evidence of bite mark identifica-
natural parents and the reason for their adoption. This crisis is aggravated, according to the
expert, if the adoptive child discovers that the adoptive parents rebuffed an attempt by the natural
parents to gain custody. Id. at 589, 291 N.W.2d at 599.
114. R.P.R. involved a custody dispute between the adoptive parents of an infant and his
natural mother.
115. R.P.R., 95 Wis. 2d at 590, 291 N.W.2d at 599 (citing C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EvI-
DENCE, § 13, at 29-31 (2d ed. 1972)). The fact that this language comes, at least in part, from
McCormick is significant because it is McCormick to whom the Walstad court looked for its
language in support of the general relevancy rule. Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d at 518, 351 N.W.2d at
486-87.
116. Wis. STAT. §§ 907.02 and 907.03 (1975).
117. See State v. Stinson, 134 Wis. 2d 224, 233-34, 397 N.W.2d 136, 139-40 (Ct. App. 1986).
118. See infra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
119. R.P.R., 95 Wis. 2d at 590, 291 N.W.2d at 600.
120. The Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision to overturn R.P.R. was based entirely on the
court of appeal's erroneous ruling that there exists a presumption in favor of the natural parents in
an adoption proceeding. Accordingly, it never reached the issue of the scientific evidence which
was withheld. Brandt v. Riordan, 95 Wis. 2d 573, 291 N.W.2d 591 (1980).
121. 134 Wis. 2d 224, 397 N.W.2d 136 (Ct. App. 1986).
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tion against a criminal defendant. 22 The defendant sought to exclude the
testimony on the ground that it, too, failed the third prong of the test in
R.P.R..23 However, unfortunately for the defendant, by this time the
supreme court had already passed on the Walstad case.124 Accordingly, the
First District Court of Appeals made the following ruling with respect to
the R.P.R. test.
In Walstad, our supreme court expressly rejected the application
of the Frye rule in Wisconsin. The standard for admissibility in Frye
required general acceptance of the scientific principle underlying the
evidence offered. We conclude that the test we applied in R.P.R.
contains nothing more than a variation of the Frye rule and there-
fore should be rejected. Walstad states that evidence given by a
qualified expert is admissible irrespective of the underlying scientific
theory.
125
This rejection of the R.P.R. test by the First District in Stinson was in
unequivocal terms. However, two years later, the same First District 126
inexplicably quoted the same language from R.P.R. as authority for the
admission of expert testimony concerning whether force used by law en-
forcement personnel was excessive in Kalt v. Milwaukee Board of Fire
Commissioners.127
There is no explanation for the re-emergence of this language in the Kalt
case. The state of the R.P.R. test after this language is, likewise, uncertain.
Because it originally decided Stinson, the court would be completely within
its power to reverse itself. However, if it was the decision to reinstate the
R.P.R. test which moved the court to quote the language again, this was not
122. Stinson was charged with the murder of a seventy-three year old woman. The state
offered testimony from the medical examiner to the effect that the victim had eight complete or
partial bite marks on her body, and these bitemarks were inflicted prior to death. Id. at 228, 397
N.W.2d at 137.
The state also offered the testimony of two forensic odontologists who testified on the subject
of bite mark identification. Bite mark analysis seeks to identify persons by comparing their denti-
tion to a bite registration in flesh or other material. The underlying principle is that each person
will leave a unique pattern. Id. at 228 n. 1, 397 N.W.2d at 137 n.1.
123. The Stinson court stated: "The defense in this case contends that the state of the scien-
tific knowledge in the subject of bite mark identification is not sufficiently developed to allow a
reasonable opinion to be asserted by an expert. To support this argument, Stinson relies on the...
language in In re Adoption ofR.P.R.." Id. at 233, 397 N.W.2d at 139.
124. The decision in Walstad had come two years earlier. State v. Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d 483,
351 N.W.2d 469 (1984).
125. Stinson, 134 Wis. 2d at 233-34, 397 N.W.2d at 139-40.
126. During this time period, the First District Court of Appeals consisted of Moser, P.J.,
and Wedemeyer and Sullivan, JJ..
127. 145 Wis. 2d 504, 516-17, 427 N.W.2d 408, 414 (Ct. App. 1988).
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made clear. Certainly, it is not as clear as the language originally overrul-
ing the test in the Stinson decision. 128
The court of appeals could have reasonably decided that the three pro-
nged R.P.R. test did not, in fact, constitute a restatement of the Frye rule.129
This is because the third prong of the R.P.R. test, that was found objection-
able by the court in Stinson, does not require that the scientific principle
have attained general acceptance before being admitted. 130 In fact, the
third prong of the R.P.R. test only requires that the state of the art be
sufficiently developed to ensure the proper degree of reliability as to the
expert's opinion. This standard is much lower than general acceptance.13 1
Arguably, if an expert can show to the court that the subject matter is suffi-
ciently reliable, the evidence will be admitted even if the testifying expert is
the only one to espouse the theory.
Because the supreme court has not passed on the language in R.P.R.,132
it is difficult to speculate as to whether it will be interpreted consistently
with the analysis above. This, however, is not as important as the fact that
the court sees the need to regulate, in some way, the unbridled admission of
scientific testimony. Arguably, this is the result of an inherent need for the
evidence to be reliable before its admission.
128. The court of appeals in Stinson mentioned Walstad and Frye by name, and expressly
stated that the language from R.P.R. was overruled. Stinson, 134 Wis. 2d at 233-34, 397 N.W.2d
at 139. In the Kalt opinion, however, not only is the R.P.R. language resurrected, it is cited in the
paragraph directly above a cite to Walstad. Kalt, 145 Wis. 2d at 516-517, 427 N.W.2d at 414.
129. There is a viable argument that the language in R.P.R., requiring the subject to be "suffi-
ciently developed," does not contradict the supreme court's prohibition of Frye, which requires
the subject to be "generally accepted" by experts in the field. Professor McCormick makes an
argument which is analogous to this when he discusses the "reasonable reliance" standard in FED.
R. EVID. 703. He states that the Federal Rules of Evidence
do not explicitly distinguish between scientific and other forms of expert testimony, and
they permit experts to rely on facts or data not otherwise admissible into evidence as long
as they are "reasonably relied upon by experts in [the] particular field." Plainly, "reason-
able reliance" is not synonymous with general acceptance.
C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 203, at 607 (3d ed. 1984).
In the same way, "sufficient development" need not be synonymous with general acceptance.
130. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
131. If "sufficient development" and "general acceptance" are found to be distinguishable
standards, clearly the former presents a lower barrier to the admissibility of scientific evidence.
By definition, there need only be one person to espouse the theory underlying the scientific evi-
dence, so long as he or she can convince the judge it is sufficiently developed to be reliable.
132. While the supreme court did address other aspects of the case, the three-pronged test for
admissibility was not addressed by them. Brandt v. Witzling, 98 Wis. 2d 613, 297 N.W.2d 833
(1980).
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E. Brain v. Mann, and the Attempt to Interject Reliability
Along with the language used by the court in the R.P.R. line of cases,
there has been at least one attempt by the trial bench to interject a degree of
reliability into the admission of expert testimony. In Brain v. Mann,1 33 the
plaintiff in a personal injury action sought to admit testimony with respect
to the loss of future earning capacity from a vocational rehabilitation spe-
cialist."' Interestingly, the defendant did not object to the qualifications of
the expert to render an opinion on the issue of future earning capacity;
rather, the defendant objected to surveys, relied upon by the expert, as inad-
equate foundation upon which to base an expert opinion.13 1
The trial judge136 agreed with the defendant's argument, stating in his
opinion that the survey information did not "cross the threshold of reliabil-
ity which is required for admission of opinions and if it did the prejudice to
the defendant.., would outweigh any probative value that it would have,
given the infirmity that I've mentioned, under Rule... 904.03. ' '137 The
trial court then struck the expert's testimony and, as a result, the proper
foundation was not laid for testimony from the plaintiff's economist.
Therefore, the plaintiff was not allowed to submit an instruction on loss of
earning capacity to the jury. 38
The court of appeals rejected the trial court's attempt to interject relia-
bility into the admission of expert testimony, stating that "the trial court
incorrectly focused on the statistical soundness of the surveys" used by the
expert.1 39 The court of appeals weighed heavily the fact that the expert
testified that such surveys were relied upon by vocational rehabilitation spe-
cialists. Therefore, the court of appeals held that the testimony should have
been admitted under Wisconsin Rule of Evidence 907.03.1°
The effect of the court's holding is to put the fox in charge of the eviden-
tiary chicken coop. Once an expert is qualified, 141 and he or she testifies
that the evidence is of a type relied upon by others in the field, the trial
133. 129 Wis. 2d 447, 385 N.W.2d 227 (Ct. App. 1986).
134. Id. at 457, 385 N.W.2d at 231-32.
135. Id., 385 N.W.2d at 232.
136. The trial judge was the Honorable Ralph Adam Fine. Judge Fine is now a judge with
the First District Court of Appeals. Unfortunately, Judge Fine has yet to have the opportunity to
rule on this issue at the court of appeals.
137. Mann, 129 Wis. 2d at 458, 385 N.W.2d at 232.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 459, 385 N.W.2d 232.
140. Id.
141. This qualification takes place pursuant to the factors listed in Wis. STAT. § 907.02.
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judge's hands are tied and the evidence must be admitted.'42 However, this
need not be the result. A reasoned interpretation of existing law can allow
the trial judge to properly balance the competing interests.
III. INTERPRETING THE WISCONSIN RULES OF EVIDENCE TO CURB
THE ABUSE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
Because of the dangers associated with the admission of expert testi-
mony, 143 it is critical to look for the proper balance between allowing virtu-
ally unlimited expert testimony, as in the general relevance test,'" and
relatively restricted expert testimony, as in the general acceptance test. 145
Recognizing this problem, a number of writers have recently posited possi-
ble solutions.146 These solutions range from the application of a "substan-
tial acceptance" test,147 to amending Rule 702,148 to creating specialized
'"science courts" to hear cases in which scientific testimony is to be
offered. 149
The solution proposed by this comment is not as drastic. The recogni-
tion that scientific evidence must be reliable to be relevant, as well as a
142. The court does not address what would happen if an opposing expert gave the opinion
that experts in the field do not rely on the information used by his counterpart. Arguably, this
scenario presents a situation in which the trial judge should make a determination as to its
admissibility.
143. See supra notes 86-111 and accompanying text.
144. State v. Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d 483, 351 N.W.2d 469 (1984).
145. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
146. See generally Black, supra note 11; Giannelli, supra note 34; Imwinkelried, supra note
20.
147. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, § 203, at 608 n. 26 (3d ed. 1984).
148. See generally Black, supra note 11. Black suggests amending FED. R. EvID. 702 to
incorporate the concepts of validity and reliability to the determination of whether to admit scien-
tific testimony. As amended, Black's Rule 702 would read as follows:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowl-
edge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise. When the witness offers testimony based on scientific knowledge, such testi-
mony shall be admitted only if the court determines that the opinion:
1) is based on scientifically valid reasoning; and
2) is sufficiently reliable that its probative value outweighs the dangers specified in
Rule 403.
Id. at 611.
Another commentator seeks the same result by merely inserting the word "reliable" before the
words "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge" in the existing Rule 702. Lederer,
Resolving the Frye Dilemma - A Reliability Approach, 115 F.R.D. 79, 84-85 (1987).
149. See, eg., Kantrowitz, Controlling Technology Democratically, 63 AM. SCI. 505 (1975);
Martin, The Proposed "Science Court", 75 MICH. L. REv. 1058 (1977); Talbott, "Science Court'"
A Possible Way to Obtain Scientific Certainty for Decisions Based on Scientific "Fact?", 8 ENvTL.
L. 827 (1978).
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reasoned application of existing relevance rules, will take the bench and bar
of Wisconsin a step closer to resolving the problem.
A. The Reliability of Scientific Evidence
Under the general relevance theory, scientific evidence is treated no dif-
ferently by the court than any other evidence."' 0 This being the case, as
long as it has any tendency to make a fact in is-sue more or less probable,
such evidence will be admitted.151 However, as was seen above, there are
dangers inherent in scientific evidence that are different than in other types
of evidence; namely, the problems of who determines relevance and how
juries typically react to such evidence.15 2 Because of these dangers, scien-
tific evidence must be treated differently than other evidence when deter-
mining its relevance.
To be relevant, that is, to have any tendency to make a fact in issue
more or less probable, scientific evidence must be reliable. As was stated
earlier, the reliability of evidence derived from scientific principles depends
upon the validity of the underlying principle, the validity of the technique
applying that principle, and the proper application of the technique on the
particular occasion in question.15 3 Under the current application of the
general relevance test, these questions are answered by the jury. 54 The ef-
fect of this is that the jury decides, after hearing the evidence, whether it is
reliable, and therefore relevant.
Along with the problem of relevancy, scientific evidence presents an-
other problem that stems from the questions surrounding its reliability.
Unless we can determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the sci-
entific evidence is reliable, it is difficult, if not impossible, to properly gauge
its probative value.1 55 This problem presents practical difficulties for the
trial judge under the present general relevancy test.
150. See supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
151. Wis. STAT. § 901.04 (1975).
152. See supra notes 86-111 and accompanying text.
153. See Giannelli, supra notes 34 and 88 and accompanying text.
154. Under the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence, there is a strong tendency to admit as much
evidence as possible, leaving the issues of credibility to the jury. State v. Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d 1,
398 N.W.2d 763 (1987); State v. Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d 483, 351 N.W.2d 469 (1984); State v.
Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 329 N.W.2d 386 (1983).
155. See Saltzburg, Frye and Alternative, 99 F.R.D. 188, 208 (1983). Speaking specifically of
Frye, Saltzburg stated the following.
[The idea] that scientific principles and discoveries that were better established would be
more quickly embraced signifies that where judges and juries are in no position to assess for
themselves the validity of claims made by an expert, some guarantee of reliability and some
indication of the extent of the reliability must exist independent of the claim of the one
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As was stated earlier, under the Wisconsin general relevancy test, all
scientific evidence, if given by a qualified expert, is admissible.1 16 This gen-
eral rule is subject only to the provisions of Rule 904.03, which act to ex-
clude relevant evidence on the grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of
time." 7 The task of the trial judge under Rule 904.03, is to determine
whether the probative value of the scientific evidence is outweighed by the
prejudicial effect it will have on the jury. "I The trial judge must be able to
determine both the probative value of the scientific evidence and the preju-
dicial effect if he or she is to be able to weigh them.
Under the current test, the trial judge never has to determine the relia-
bility of the scientific evidence.1 59 Again, only if the evidence is reliable will
it have any probative value." ° This determination is not a proper one for a
jury. A judge deciding questions of admissibility under Rule 904.03 is de-
ciding whether the evidence should reach the jury in the first instance.1 6 1
Therefore, before making a decision as to admissibility under Rule 904.03,
the trial judge must, necessarily, rule on the reliability of the evidence.
The problem is clear. If the evidence is not relevant, or if its probative
value is outweighed by unfair prejudice, it should not be heard by the jury
in the first instance.' 62 This problem is further compounded by the danger
of the jury misusing the evidence. 163 If the trial judge allows scientific evi-
dence to go to the jury, it may be seen by the jury as tacit approval of the
evidence. Because novel scientific evidence is often highly technical and
esoteric, there is a real danger that the jury will not feel qualified to pass
upon its reliability.' 64 Accordingly, it is imperative that the trial judge rule
expert called to testify. This guarantee and this indication enable a judge or jury to credit
an expert and to evaluate how much weight to attribute to his testimony.
Id. at 212-13.
156. Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d at 518-19, 351 N.W.2d at 487.
157. Wis. STAT. § 904.03 (1975).
158. See State v. Harm, 146 Wis. 2d 130, 143, 430 N.W.2d 584, 590 (Ct. App. 1988) (Weigh-
ing probative value of evidence against prejudicial effect is a discretionary function of the trial
court.).
159. United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1975) (Unless the evidence is obvi-
ously prejudicial, it is better to admit the evidence and let the jury decide the probative value).
160. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
161. Rule 904.03 is designed to keep from the jury evidence that presents the dangers listed
therein. If the jury is allowed to decide the issue, the intended effect of Rule 904.03 is lost. WIs.
STAT. § 904.03 (1975).
162. Wis. STAT. §§ 904.02 and 904.03 (1975).
163. If the jury hears evidence which is later determined by them to be unreliable, even the
most conscientious juror may have difficulty disregarding it. In effect, it is not possible to "unring
the bell". Imwinkelried, supra note 20, at 604-05.
164. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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on the reliability of the scientific evidence as a preliminary question, before
allowing it to go to the jury.
B. Preliminary Questions
The Wisconsin Rules of Evidence provide two standards for the deter-
mination of preliminary questions.'65 First, there is the standard under
Rule 901.04(1), which deals with admissibility generally, and states: "Pre-
liminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness,
the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be deter-
mined by the judge, subject to sub. (2). In making this determination, the
judge is bound by the rules of evidence only with respect to privileges." '166
Second, Rule 901.04(2) deals with conditional relevance and states: "When
the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of
fact, the judge shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evi-
dence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition." 167
The language in subsection (1) stating that the question "shall be deter-
mined by the judge" has been interpreted to be a "preponderance of the
evidence" standard. 161 On the other hand, the conditional relevance lan-
guage in subsection (2) sets forth a "sufficiency" standard. Obviously, the
"preponderance" standard is higher than the "sufficiency" standard with
respect to the admission of evidence. 169
At first blush, the question of scientific evidence seems to be one of con-
ditional relevance. That is, its relevance is conditioned upon its reliability.
If this were the case, however, a judge would merely decide whether a jury
could reasonably determine that the reliability questions were answered af-
firmatively. 7  The danger of it being unreliable, and therefore irrelevant,
still exists.
This apparent inconsistency is reconciled when one considers that scien-
tific evidence is, by its nature, inextricably bound up with, and in many
ways analogous to, expert testimony.' 71 Scientific evidence invariably
165. Wis. STAT. § 901.04 (1975).
166. Wis. STAT. § 901.04(1) (1975).
167. Wis. STAT. § 901.04(2) (1975).
168. See, e.g., Christensen v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 77 Wis. 2d 50, 252 N.W.2d 81
(1977).
169. Because it is subjective, there is no suitable definition of how much evidence is needed to
be sufficient to support a finding that the conditionally relevant fact exists. Each trial judge deter-
mines this for him or herself. In any event, the standard is agreed to be lower than the fifty-one
percent requirement under the preponderance standard. See Imwinkelried, supra note 20, at 596-
97; Ball, The Myth of Conditional Relevancy, 14 GA. L. REv. 435, 438 (1980).
170. Wis. STAT. § 901.04(2) (1975).
171. Professor Imwinkelried writes:
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comes into the courtroom through an expert witness. Just as the expert's
opinions are conditioned upon his qualification under Rule 907.02, the rele-
vance of the scientific evidence is conditioned upon its reliability. 172
Questions surrounding the qualification of expert witnesses are deter-
mined using the subsection (1) "preponderance" standard. 173 That is, the
trial judge decides by a preponderance of the evidence that the witness is
qualified as an expert under Rule 907.02. In the same way, questions sur-
rounding the reliability of scientific evidence should be determined by a
"preponderance" of the evidence. The effect of this application would be
twofold.
First, trial courts would guarantee that the scientific evidence is relevant
before it is allowed to go before the jury. No longer would there be the fear
that the jury would misuse the evidence, as the judge would have already
ruled upon it. Second, there would be greater flexibility in the system, be-
cause the trial judge would be able to make a determination as to the admis-
sibility of each piece of scientific evidence. Further discussion of this
second effect is in order.
Under both the general acceptance and general relevancy standards,
once an expert is qualified as an expert,174 or the procedure has gained gen-
eral acceptance, 175 as the case may be, there is not further inquiry into the
subject of admissibility. However, during the course of testimony, an ex-
pert may have a number of opinions. Likewise, the testimony given by the
witness depends upon the questions asked of him during direct and cross
examination. The preponderance standard for admissibility, found in Rule
901.04(1), allows the trial judge to constantly monitor the questioning to
ensure that the witness will testify only to those things which, (1) he or she
is qualified to render an opinion upon,176 and (2) meet the preponderance
Scientific evidence is a type of expert testimony. The rationale for admitting expert testi-
mony is that the expert's knowledge or skill enables the expert to draw inferences beyond a
lay person's capability. Courts often assert that to be admissible, expert testimony must
relate to a subject beyond the understanding of lay people.
Imwinkelried, supra note 20, at 604 (emphasis added).
Because scientific testimony is offered for the same reasons, it is logical to use the same stan-
dard for deciding preliminary questions regarding its admissibility.
172. Wis. STAT. § 907.02 (1975).
173. Wis. STAT. § 901.04(1) (1975). The language of this subsection specifically includes
"Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness."
174. Under the general relevancy theory, the witness need only be qualified as an expert
under Wis. STAT. § 907.02 before his or her opinion can be put before the jury. See Walstad, 119
Wis. 2d at 518-19, 351 N.W.2d at 487.
175. Under the general acceptance test, it is the underlying principle or technique which must
have gained general acceptance in the relevant field of science. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013.
176. The qualification falls under Wis. STAT. § 907.02 (1975).
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standard for reliability. 77 Application of Rule 901.04(1) to the preliminary
questions of reliability represents the proper balance of the competing inter-
ests embodied in the general acceptance and general relevancy tests.
To begin to solve the problems of reliability with respect to scientific
testimony, then, Wisconsin courts must first accept the premise that, to be
relevant, scientific testimony must be reliable. Leaving this determination
to the jury undermines the principle that only relevant evidence should be
put before them.7 Only the trial judge, making the decision by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, is in the position to properly determine whether the
evidence is reliable and therefore relevant. Accordingly, application of the
Rule 901.04(1) standard to the preliminary questions of reliability repre-
sents the proper balance for determining the admissibility of scientific
evidence.
IV. CONCLUSION
Expert witnesses have become a fact of life in American courtrooms.
With them, in many instances, has come novel scientific testimony. Be-
cause scientific testimony can determine the outcome of a case, courts need
to address the issue of whether it should be admitted.
To date, two schools of thought predominate with respect to the admis-
sion of scientific evidence. The general acceptance approach of Frye, and
the general relevancy approach as seen in Wisconsin. While both of these
theories have merit, they fail to adequately consider the underlying problem
with scientific testimony. That is, balancing the desire to put forth all possi-
ble evidence with the fact that, to be relevant, scientific evidence must be
reliable.
The general relevancy theory advocates the admission of all scientific
evidence, if offered by a qualified expert. The jury is then to decide the
weight, if any, to be given to the testimony. What this approach fails to
consider is that if the evidence is not reliable, it loses its relevance. Even
though only relevant evidence is admissible, the jury will have already
heard it.
For its part, the Frye rule does consider the importance of reliability to
the consideration of whether to allow scientific testimony. However, the
general acceptance test it employs places a standard upon the admissibility
of scientific evidence that is more appropriate for determining judicial no-
177. Under Wis. STAT. § 901.04(1), preliminary questions are answered using the preponder-
ance test.
178. Wis. STAT. § 904.02 (1975).
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tice. In so doing, it fails to properly consider the interest in allowing the
jury to receive all relevant evidence.
Wisconsin courts can properly balance these competing interests. First,
trial courts must recognize that relevance of scientific evidence is inextrica-
bly bound up with reliability. Therefore, trial judges must make relevance
determinations before this evidence goes before the jury. To do this, trial
courts need to apply the Rule 901.04(1) preponderance standard to the pre-
liminary questions which relate to the reliability of scientific evidence. This
test represents both an equitable balance between the competing concerns,
and a significant step in the right direction.
CRAIG A. KUBIAK
